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Abstract—This paper proposes a novel cooperative secure
unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) aided transmission protocol,
where a source (Alice) sends confidential information to a des-
tination (Bob) via an energy-constrained UAV-mounted amplify-
and-forward (AF) relay in the presence of a ground eavesdropper
(Eve). We adopt destination-assisted cooperative jamming (CJ)
as well as simultaneous wireless information and power transfer
(SWIPT) at the UAV-mounted relay to enhance physical-layer
security (PLS) and transmission reliability. Assuming a low
altitude UAV, we derive connection probability (CP), secrecy
outage probability (SOP), instantaneous secrecy rate, and av-
erage secrecy rate (ASR) of the proposed protocol over Air-
Ground (AG) channels, which are modeled as Rician fading with
elevation-angel dependent parameters. By simulations, we verify
our theoretical results and demonstrate significant performance
improvement of our protocol, when compared to conventional
transmission protocol with ground relaying and UAV-based trans-
mission protocol without destination-assisted jamming. Finally,
we evaluate the impacts of different system parameters and
different UAV’s locations on the proposed protocol in terms of
ASR.
Index Terms—UAV relaying, wireless information and power
transfer, physical layer security, jamming.
I INTRODUCTION
U
NMANNED aerial vehicle (UAV) based wireless com-
munications has recently attracted significant research
attentions, since it is envisioned to play a paramount role
in establishing and/or improving ubiquitous and seamless
connectivity of communication devices as well as enhancing
capacity of future wireless networks [1]–[5].
UAVs have been introduced as aerial relays (see [6]–
[9] and references therein) in support of long-distance data
transmissions from source to destination in heavily shadowed
environments and/or highly overloaded scenarios. Typically,
due to UAVs mobility, UAVs require a sufficiently high energy
resources, which can be supported via energy harvesting
techniques such as wireless energy harvesting (WEH) [10] as
well as simultaneous wireless information and power transfer
(SWIPT) [11]. WEH harvests energy in a controlled manner
from the ambient radio-frequency (RF) signals, while SWIPT
not only captures information signals, but also harvests energy
of the same signals concurrently [11], [12]. Specifically, a
power splitting (PS) architecture is required to divide the
received signal into two separate streams of different power
levels, one for signal processing and the other for simultaneous
energy harvesting [13].
One technical challenge of UAV-assisted communications is
to guarantee physical layer security. The unique characteris-
tics of Air-Ground (AG) channels can provide good channel
condition for legitimate nodes, but, on the other hand, is
prone to eavesdropping by non-legitimate nodes [14], [15].
Exploiting PLS techniques in UAV-assisted communications
has been studied in [16]–[19] (see references therein). In [16],
the authors have studied PLS of a UAV-enabled mobile relay-
ing scheme over non-fading AG channels, and showed that
moving buffer-aided relay provides significant performance
over static relaying in terms of secrecy rate. In [17], the authors
studied the resource allocation and path-planning problem
for energy-efficient secure transmission from a UAV base
station to multiple users in the presence of a passive ground
eavesdropper. In [18], employing UAV as a friendly jammer
to enhance PLS of a ground-relaying based communication
has been studied. In [19], the authors have examined SWIPT-
enabled secure transmission of millimeter wave (mmWave)
for a UAV relay network, where the UAV feeds the energy-
constrained IoT destination device in the presence of multiple
ground eavesdroppers while a free-space path loss (PL) model
for AG links was adopted.
In this paper, we consider a practical scenario where a low-
altitude UAV relaying is employed to assist communications
between source and destination nodes. Based on the recent
channel measurements in [20], [21], low-altitude UAV relay
channels may also suffer from small scale fading compared to
high-altitude cases. Hence, we assume that AG channel models
are Rician fading of different parameters. Then, we tackle the
aforementioned security and energy limitation challenges and
we make the following contributions.
• We propose a secure and energy-efficient transmission
protocol, where a source sends confidential informa-
tion to a destination via an energy-constrained UAV-
mounted amplify-and-forward (AF) relay in the presence
of a passive eavesdropper. In the protocol, we adopt
the destination-assisted cooperative jamming (CJ) and
SWIPT techniques at the UAV based relay for PLS
improvements as well as energy harvesting.
• We analyze the proposed secure transmission protocol
in terms of reliability and security. In particular, we
derive connection probability, secrecy outage probability,
instantaneous secrecy rate, and average secrecy rate of the
proposed protocol from source to destination via relay.
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Fig. 1. UAV-mounted low-altitude secure relaying communication based on
destination assisted jamming and SWIPT
• We conduct simulations to i) verify our theoretical re-
sults, ii) identify the best location of the UAV based relay
that provides the best average secrecy rate, iii) evaluate
impacts of different system parameters on the system
performance in terms of reliability and security, and
finally iv) validate the effectiveness and improvements
of the proposed protocol, when compared to convectional
transmission protocol with ground relaying and UAV-
based transmission protocol without destination-assisted
jamming.
The rest of this paper is organized as below. Section II
presents system model and channel model. In Section III, we
propose the UAV-based transmission protocol with destination-
assisted jamming and SWIPT techniques. In Section IV, we
conduct performance analysis. Numerical results are given in
Section V, and finally, conclusions are drawn in Section VI.
II SYSTEM MODEL AND CHANNEL MODEL
In this section, we introduce system model and channel
model.
II-A System Model
We consider a point-to-point secure transmission scheme
(see Fig. 1), where we employ a UAV-mounted relay (U) to
assist confidential transmission from a source node A to a
legitimate destination node B over heavily shadowed areas
in the presence of a ground passive eavesdropper E. The
locations of source, destination, and eavesdropper are fixed
on the ground with their 3D coordination: WA = (0, 0, 0),
WB = (Dx, 0, 0),WE = (Ex, Ey, 0), while UAV is located at
WU = (Ux, Uy, H) and H is its altitude from ground surface.
We assume that all nodes with a single antenna operate in
a half-duplex mode and the UAV relay node (U) adopts AF
protocol. Further, we assume the relaying node (U) uses si-
multaneous wireless information and power transfer (SWIPT)
technology to harvest energy from the received radio frequency
(RF) signals transmitted by A and B, while it also uses its on-
board battery for maneuvering and staying stationary in the
sky. Finally, we assume that the UAV receiver adopts power
splitting architecture (see Fig. 2), where β (0 ≤ β ≤ 1)
is the power splitting ratio (PSR) identifying the portion of
the harvested power from the received RF signals and 1 − β
denotes the PSR for signal processing at the AF relay.
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Fig. 2. Power Splitting Structure for the SWIPT-enabled relaying at UAV
II-B Channel Model
Here we consider both small-scale fading and large-scale
PL in setting up the channel model. We assume the channel
between U and the ground node G ∈ {A, B, E} is Rician
fading but with different values of Rice parameters. Exploit-
ing channel reciprocity, the normalized channel power gain
between the links A⇔U, U⇔B, and U⇔E denoted by
Sij
∆
= |hij |2 ij ∈ {au, ub, ue} (1)
follow a square Rice distribution (i.e., non-central chi-square
(nc-χ2) distribution) with two degrees of freedom, corre-
sponding to line-of-sight (LOS) and non-line-of-sight (NLOS)
components whose probability density function (PDF) and
cumulative distribution function (CDF) are
fij(x) = (Kij + 1)e
−Kij exp
(
− (Kij + 1)x
)
× I0
(
2
√
Kij(Kij + 1)x
)
, (2)
and
Fij(x) = 1−Q
(√
2Kij,
√
2(1 +Kij)x
)
, (3)
where x holds any non-negative value, fij(·) and Fij(·) denote
the PDF and the CDF for the link, and I0(·) represents the
modified Bessel function of the first kind and zero-order, Kij
(in dB) is the K-factor given by [22]
Kij(θij) = κm + (κM − κm) 2θij
π
, (4)
where κM and κm are two constants depending on the
environment and transmission frequency, θij (in radian) is the
elevation angle between two given nodes.
Furthermore, we assume the channel model between ground
nodes is Rayleigh fading, a special case of Rician fading with
K = 0, and thus the channel power gain for the links A⇔E,
Sae
∆
= |hae|2, and B⇔E, Sbe ∆= |hbe|2 can be modeled as
exponential distribution with unit scale parameters.
For large scale PL, considering the probability of LOS [23],
we adopt elevation-angle dependent PL component
αij(θij) =
αL − αN
1 + ω1 exp (−ω2 (θij − ω1)) + αN , (5)
where αL and αN represent PL exponents for LOS links
between two nodes (θij =
π
2 ), and NLOS links (θij = 0),
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Fig. 3. Diagram of the proposed secure UAV-enabled relaying with SWIPT
respectively, and ω1 and ω2 are environmental constants.
Letting dij
∆
= ‖Wi −Wj‖ be the Euclidean distance between
two nodes, we let Lij(αij , dij)
∆
= d
−αij
ij as the PL model. Note
that for G2G links with θij = 0, the PL model follows only
NLOS components, however, for AG links the PL component
is between αL and αN depending on the elevation-angel
between nodes.
III PROPOSED TRANSMISSION PROTOCOL
We consider the following two equal-duration phase secure
transmission protocol with an overall duration T seconds (Fig.
3). During the first time slot, A sends information signal
to U and simultaneously, B transmits a jamming signal to
degrade the wiretap channel of E as well as to assist the energy
harvesting of UAV. Then the AF relay U receives
yu =
√
(1 − β)PaLauhauxa +
√
(1− β)PbLbuhbuxb
+
√
(1− β)nu + np, (6)
where xa and xb denote the normalized information signal
from A, and jamming signal from B, i.e.,
E{‖xa‖2} = E{‖xb‖2} = 1,
and Pa and Pb represent transmit power from A and jamming
power from B, which satisfy
Pa + Pb = P, (7)
and P is fixed for each frame. Further, we assume
Pa = λP Pb = (1− λ)P (8)
where 0 < λ < 1 is the power allocation factor. Besides,
np represents signal processing noise at the power splitting
component with power Np, and nu ∽ N (0, N0) is the
Additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) at U. The energy
harvested by U from the received signals can be written as
EH = εβ(PaLauSau + PbLbuSbu +N0)T/2, (9)
where ε is the power conversion efficiency factor for the
harvester. Here, we assume that the total harvested energy
during the first phase will be used for signal transmission in
the second phase and is given by
Pu = εβ(PaSau + PbSbu +N0). (10)
Different from [16] where no direct link was assumed to
exists from A to E, here we consider a more general scenario
during which E may also overhear the confidential messages
from A to U due to broadcast nature of wireless media.
Specifically, if E is located on the ground that is in not so
far from A, E can attempt to decode the received signal
information based on the received signal-to-interference-plus-
noise ratio (SINR)
γ
(1)
E =
PaSaeLae
PbSbeLbe +N0
. (11)
In the second phase, U forwards the scaled version of xu =
Gyu to B with the amplification factor
G =
√
Pu
(1 − β)(PaSau + PbSbu +N0) +Np , (12)
where Pu is in (10). The resultant signal at the node K ∈{E,
B} can be expressed as
y˜k =G
√
(1− β)Pahauhukxa︸ ︷︷ ︸
Information signal component
+ G
√
(1− β)Pbhbuhukxb︸ ︷︷ ︸
Destination jamming interference
+ G(
√
(1− β)nu + np)huk + nk︸ ︷︷ ︸
Noise
, (13)
Owning to the fact that B is assumed to be able to conduct
full self-interference cancellation, hence the term of jamming
interference can be canceled from (13), whereas E acts with
this part as an interference. Therefore, the received SINR
at B and E can be obtained as
γA 7→B =
εβ(1− β)PaSauSubLauLub
εβ(1 − β + ζ)SubLubN0 + (1− β)N0 + ǫ , (14)
and
γ
(2)
E =
εβ(1− β)PaSauSueLauLue
εβ(1− β)PbSbuSueLbuLue + (1 − β)N0
+ εβ (1− β + ζ)SueLueN0 + ǫ
, (15)
where
ζ
∆
=
Np
N0
ǫ
∆
=
NpN0
PaSau + PbSub
. (16)
For the rest of the paper, we assume ǫ = 0 for simplicity
of the result. This assumption holds for moderate/high signal-
to-noise ratios (SNRs). Consequently, for the wiretap link, the
total SINR at E, denoted by γE , is given by
γE = max{γ(1)E , γ(2)E }, (17)
which are given in (11) and (15), respectively.
IV PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
In this section, we derive connection probability, secrecy
outage probability, instantaneous secrecy rate, as well as
achievable average secrecy rate of the proposed transmission
protocol. In the derivations, we assume that the channel
coefficients between nodes remain constants during each frame
and vary from one frame to next independently.
4IV-A Connection Probability
Definition 1. The connection probability (CP), i.e., the prob-
ability that B is able to decode the transmitted signal
from A and correctly extract the secure information messages
[24], is defined as
Pc
∆
= Pr{CM > Rt}, (18)
where
CM =
1
2
log2(1 + γA 7→B), (19)
and Rt denote the instantaneous capacity and transmission
rate of A-B via U, which is normalized by bandwidth as [25],
where γA 7→B is given by (14).
The following theorem provides an analytical closed-form
expression of Pc.
Theorem 1. We derive the CP of the secure UAV-based
relaying in (20), where δt
∆
= 22Rt − 1, D and R are
two positive integers controlling the accuracy of (20), Γ(·)
represents the gamma function, ζ is given in (16), d, u, s, r
are dummy variables, Kij , ij ∈ {au, ub} is given in (4), and
Iν(·) is the modified Bessel function of the first kind with the
order of ν.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Remark: From Theorem 1, we observe that (20) is a
decreasing function with respect to (w.r.t) Pa, implying that
as the source transmission power increases, the reliability of
communication improves.
IV-B Secrecy Outage Probability
Following [26], when the instantaneous capacity of the
wiretap link CE , defined as
CE =
1
2
log2(1 + γE) (21)
is larger than the rate difference Re = Rt −Rs, where Rs is
rate of the confidential information from A-B via U, then the
secrecy outage occurs and the eavesdropper is able to intercept
the transmitted confidential information via U. The analytical
expression for Pso is given by Theorem below.
Theorem 2. The analytical expression for secrecy outage
probability Pso is given below.
Pso = Pr{CE > Re} = Pr {γE > δe}
= Pr{max
(
γ
(1)
E , γ
(2)
E
)
> δe}
= 1− Pr{γ(1)E ≤ δe}︸ ︷︷ ︸
L1
Pr{γ(2)E ≤ δe}︸ ︷︷ ︸
L2
, (22)
where δe
∆
= 22Re − 1, and
L1 = 1−
PaLae exp
(
− N0δePaLae
)
PbLbeδe + PaLae
, (23)
and L2 is given in (24), where Kν(·) denotes the modified
Bessel function with the second kind and ν-th order and
d, u, r, q, s are dummy variables.
Proof. See Appendix B.
IV-C Instantaneous Secrecy Rate
Definition 2. The maximum achievable instantaneous secrecy
rate (ISR), denoted by CS , of the proposed UAV-enabled
relaying network is defined as
CS
∆
= [CM − CE ]+
=
[
1
2
log2
(
1 + γA 7→B
1 + γE
)]+
=
[
1
2
log2
(
1 +
γA 7→B − γE
1 + γE
)]+
, (26)
where [x]+
∆
= max(x, 0), CM is the capacity between A-
B given in (19), and CE is the capacity of the wiretap link
given in (21), and γA 7→B and γE are given in (14) and (17),
respectively.
Note that we assume that the channel coefficients between
nodes remain constants during each frame and vary from one
frame to next independently. Then all parameters in (26) are
assumed to be known except the power allocation factor λ,
thereby we form the following optimization problem
maximize
λ
CS(λ)
subject to Pa + Pb = P
Pa = λP
Pb = (1− λ)P.
Considering CS ≥ 0 is guaranteed under optimal power
allocation, the above optimization problem is equivalent to
finding the optimal power allocation factor, i.e.,
λ⋆ = argmax φ(λ) s.t. 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1, (27)
where
φ(λ) =
γA 7→B − γE
1 + γE
, (28)
which is due to the fact that log2(1+φ(λ)) in (26) is a strictly
increasing function w.r.t φ(λ), and thus (27) can be solved
analytically in the high SNR regime as given in Theorem 3.
Theorem 3. In large SNR regime, the function φ(λ) in (28)
is proven to be quasi-concave w.r.t λ in the feasible set where
0 < λ < 1 and λ⋆ can be obtained as
λ⋆ =
1
1 +
√
ν
, ν ≥ 1 (29)
where ν = XY +
V
W .
Proof. See Appendix C.
IV-D Achievable Average Secrecy Rate
Definition 3. The achievable average secrecy rate (ASR) is
defined as
C¯S
∆
= E{CS}, (30)
Averaging over all realizations of the channels yields C¯S in
(31).
Owning to the fact that the exact computation of (31) is an
arduous task and hence, instead, we derive a tight lower-bound
5Pc = 2(1 +Kub)e
−Kau−Kub exp
(
− (1 +Kau)(1− β + ζ)N0δt
(1 − β)PaLau
)
×
D∑
d=0
d∑
u=0
u∑
s=0
R∑
r=0
Γ(D + d)D1−2dΓ(R+ r)R1−2r
Γ(D − d+ 1)Γ(d+ 1)Γ(u− s+ 1)Γ(s+ 1)
×Kdau(Kau + 1)uKrub(1 +Kub)
r+u−s−1
2
(
(1 − β + ζ)N0δt
(1− β)PaLau
)s (
N0δt
εβPaLauLub
)u−s
× Ir+s−u+1
(
2
√
(1 +Kau)(1 +Kub)N0δt
εβPaLauLub
)
, (20)
L2 = 1− 2(1 +Kue)e
−(Kau+Kub+Kue)√
Kub
(
1 + δe
(1+Kau)PbLub
(1+Kub)PaLau
) exp

 Kub/2(
1 + δe
(1+Kau)PbLub
(1+Kub)PaLau
) − (1 +Kue)(1 − β + ζ)δeN0
(1− β)PaLau


×
D∑
d=0
d∑
u=0
u∑
r=0
Q∑
q=0
u−r∑
s=0
Θ(D,Q, d, q, u, r, s)Kque(1 +Kue)
u+q−sKdauM−(r+ 1
2
),0 (Kub + (1 +Kau)δePbLub)
×

 1
1 +
(
δe
(1+Kau)PbLub
(1+Kub)PaLau
)−1


r (
δeN0
εβPaLauLue
)u−r−s(
(1 − β + ζ)δeN0
(1− β)PaLau
)s(
δeN0
ε β Pa Lau Lue
) q+s+1
2
×Kq+s+1
(√
δeN0
ε β Pa Lau Lue
)
, (24)
where
Θ(D,Q, d, q, u, r, s) =
Q1−2 qD1−2 dΓ (s+ 1)Γ (Q+ q) Γ (D + d)
Γ (s− u+ r + 1) (Γ (u− r + 1))2 Γ (Q− q + 1)Γ (D − d+ 1) (Γ (q + 1))2 Γ (d+ 1) , (25)
C¯S = E
{[1
2
log2(1 + γA 7→B)−
1
2
log2(1 + γE)
]+}
=
1
2 ln 2
∫ ∞
x=0
∫ ∞
y=0
∫ ∞
z=0
∫ ∞
v=0
∫ ∞
w=0
[
ln
(
1 + γA 7→B
1 + γE
)]+
fX,Y,Z,V,W (x, y, z, v, w)dxdydzdvdw, (31)
for ASR in the Theorem below. First, we present the following
worthwhile lemma, by which we then delve into the derivation
of the closed-form lower-bound for the ASR in Theorem 4.
Lemma 1. Let X be a non-central chi-square random vari-
able with two degrees of freedom and the non-centrality
parameter λ, also b holds non-negative values, then the
expectation of the new random variable Y = ln(X + b), can
be obtained as follows.
E{ln(X + b)} =
∫ ∞
0
1
2
ln(x + b)e−
x+λ
2 I0(
√
λx)dx
∆
=
{
g1(λ), for b = 0
g2(λ, b), for b > 0
(32)
where g1(·) and g2(·, ·) are defined respectively as
g1(x)
(a)
= exp(−x
2
)
R∑
r=0
Lrx
r ,
g2(x, b)
(b)
= exp
(
−x
2
) R∑
r=0
Cr(b)x
r, (33)
where R is some positive integer and the coefficients Lr and
Cr(b) are given, as finite series, respectively, by
Lr =
Γ(R+ r)R1−2r(Ψ(r + 1) + ln 2)
Γ(r + 1)Γ(R− r + 1)2r , (34)
and
Cr(b) =
Γ(R+ r)R1−2rΦ(r, b)
Γ(r + 1)2Γ(R− r + 1)4r , (35)
wherein Γ(·) and Ψ(·) are the Gamma function and the Psi
function respectively defined as Γ(x)
∆
=
∫∞
0 t
x−1e−tdt and
6Ψ(x)
∆
= ddxΓ(x) [27]. Moreover, the function Φ(·, ·) in (35)
is given by (see (36)) wherein Ga,bp,q
(
a,b
p,q
∣∣x) is the analytical
MeijerG function and Γ(x, a)
∆
=
∫∞
x
e−tta−1dt is the upper
incomplete Gamma function [27]. It should be noted that
(a) and (b) are respectively obtained by applying [27, Eq.
(4.352.1)] and [27, Eq. (8.352.2)] to calculate the integral
expression given in (32), and after tedious manipulations.
Theorem 4. The lower bound of the average secrecy rate of
the proposed secure UAV-enabled relaying system is given by
C¯LB =
1
2 ln 2
[
ln(1 + exp(T1))− ln(1 + T2)
]+
, (37)
with
T1
∆
= ln
(
(1 − β)PaLau
(1− β + ζ)N0
)
+ g1(λau) + g1(λub)
− g2
(
λub,
1− β
εβ(1− β + ζ)Lub
)
, (38)
T2
∆
=
εβPa(λau + 2)
εβPb(λbu + 2) + εβ(1 +
ζ
1−β )N0 +
N0
(λue+2)
+
Pa
Pb
Lae
Lbe
exp
(
N0
PbLbe
)
E1
(
N0
PbLbe
)
. (39)
Proof. See Appendix D.
V NUMERICAL RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS
In this section, we present simulation results of connection
probability, secrecy outage, and average secrecy rate in order
to validate our theoretical results in the paper. We also demon-
strate both reliability and security performance enhancements
offered by UAV-based relaying (UR) and destination-assisted
CJ transmission protocol, compared to the case using ground
relaying (GR), and the case using UR but without destination-
jamming.
Unless otherwise stated, we consider the following system
parameters in all simulations. We assume Dx=10 (the nor-
malized distance of A-B w.r.t 100m), H=1.5 (the normalized
height at which UAV operates w.r.t 100m). We assume the
nodes locations: WA = (0, 0, 0), WB = (Dx, 0, 0), WE =
(4Dx5 , 1, 0), WU = (
Dx
5 , 0, H). The path-loss exponents
are αL=2 and αN=3.5, respectively. Besides, the network
transmission rate Rt=0.5 bits/s/Hz, the secrecy rate Rs=0.2
bits/s/Hz are adopted. Further, we assume N0 = 10
−2, ζ = 2,
energy harvesting efficiency factor ε = 0.7, ω1 = 0.28,
ω2 = 9.61, κm = 1, and κM = 10 [21], [23], [28]. Also,
the EPSA represents equal power allocation (i.e., λ = 0.5)
and equal power splitting ratio (i.e., β = 0.5). The Monte-
Carlo simulation are obtained through averaging over 100, 000
realizations of the channel coefficients.
Fig. 4 illustrates the CP in (1) for the proposed transmission
protocol with EPSA and OPSA, respectively, against the
network transmit power P . Here, OPSA refers to the case with
optimal λ⋆ and β⋆ for a given P , dU represents the horizontal
projection distance of U to A, and dR is the distance from the
ground relay to source. Here for a fair comparison, we assume
dU = dR. We can observe that the CP of OPSA-based scheme
gets approximately doubled, compared to EPSA-based one, in
the practical range of transmit power, e.g., for P = 20 dBW.
The figure compares the simulated CP and theoretical CP in
(1) of the proposed protocol with EPSA and demonstrates that
they are well matched. Fig. 4 also illustrates a significant CP
improvement of the proposed protocol, when compared to the
case using ground relaying, under the setting of EPSA.
Fig. 5 illustrates the simulated and theoretical SOP versus
network transmit power P for the proposed protocol using
CJ with λ = 0.7 and demonstrates they are well matched.
The figure also compares the proposed protocol, the UAV
based relaying without any security technique and the one
using ground relaying, and demonstrates the effectiveness of
our protocol in terms of SOP thanks to the joint effect of
destination CJ and SWIPT.
Fig. 6 compares the lower bound of ASR (see Theorem 4)
with different truncated values R (see Theorem 4) and the
simulated result using the exact expression (31). We can see
that they are very close, especially when P ≥ 17dBW. Further,
we observe that normalizing the gap between the exact value
and the lower bound w.r.t the exact value yields the relative
errors of 0.0907, 0.0617, and 0.0512 for the cases of R = 5,
R = 10, and, R = 25, respectively. This demonstrates the
finite series we obtained are acceptably valid while explicitly
truncated.
Fig. 7 depicts the impact of λ and β on ASR. Given a fixed
power budget P = 20 dBW, the ASR increases when λ and
β increase. The best ASR can be obtained at λ = 0.83 and
β = 0.8. A higher λ (i.e., higher Pa) provides higher reliability
of data transmission, but when λ > 0.83, ASR decreases
slightly. This is due to the fact that a high source power
can enhance CM and a low jamming power is sufficient to
degrade eavesdropper. Overall, the plot provides a good trade-
off between source power and destination jamming power in
terms of ASR.
Fig. 8 shows ASR against normalized horizontal distance
of the proposed protocol with and without destination CJ
for different λ values. Here normalized horizontal distance
is defined as the ratio of the horizontal distance of (A-U) to
that of (A-B). This scenario can be viewed as a relay moving
from the initial location above A with a direct path to the final
location right above B and we are seeking the best location
of U in terms of ASR.
From Fig. 8, we observe that the proposed protocol with
CJ outperforms the one without CJ, and particularly, the
proposed protocol with CJ and λ∗ leads to the best ASR,
compared to other λ values, over all different normalized
horizontal distances. Also, we observe the best location of
U is 0.9Dx. This is due to the fact that when U is near B and
far from A, we need to allocate more Pa to enhance CM
for source transmission and less Pb, which is sufficient for
destination CJ. When U is at the location of 0.2Dx − 0.5Dx
(i.e., U is in the vicinity of eavesdropper), the wiretap link
obviously reduces the ASR. Last but not least, when U is
within (0.35Dx, 0.65Dx), more proportion of the power bud-
get should be dedicated for jamming in order to improve ASR.
Fig. 9 displays ASR against UAV altitude H for the
proposed protocol with different β. Firstly, we observe that
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, (36)
10 15 20 25 30
Network Transmit Power (P) [dBW]
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
Co
nn
ec
tio
n 
Pr
ob
ab
ili
ty
UR - EPSA - Theory
UR - EPSA -  Simulation
UR - OPSA
GR - EPSA
UR - dU = 3Dx/5
GR - dR = 3Dx/5
Fig. 4. Connection Probability vs. Network Transmit Power
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Network Transmit Power (P) [dBW]
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
Se
cr
ec
y 
O
ut
ag
e 
Pr
ob
ab
ili
ty
UR - Proposed  - Theory with CJ
UR - Proposed  - Simulation with CJ
UR - Conventional
Ground Relaying
Fig. 5. Secrecy Outage Probability vs. Network Transmit Power
β = 0.75 and H = 3.5 yield the best ASR among all.
Secondly, we observe, when H increases till 3.5, ASR in-
creases to the peak, and after that, ASR decreases. This is
due to the fact that, from H = 3.5 onwards, the attenuation
factor caused by the U’s long distance from the ground nodes
significantly affects the ASR. When 0 < H ≤ 3.5, the ASR is
a quasi-concave function having one optimal value for given
system parameters. Furthermore, for U is in low altitude,
e.g., H = 0.6, increasing β (i.e., a larger proportion of the
received power is stored for EH which is then utilized in AF
relaying), yields improved ASR. For higher altitudes, the ASR
increases if 0 < β < β∗, or decreases if β∗ < β < 1, where
β∗ = 0.75. This is due to the fact that, when β > β∗, large
UAV transmission power can lead to the improved received
SNR at B, but this also yields better signal reception at Eve.
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Ratio
VI CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we proposed a secure and energy-efficient
source-UAV-destination transmission protocol with the aid of
destination cooperative jamming and SWIPT at the relay, when
a passive eavesdropper exists. We derived the connection prob-
ability, secrecy outage probability, instantaneous secrecy rate,
and average secrecy rate of the proposed transmission protocol
from A to B via a stationary U and verified them via sim-
ulations. Further, by simulations, we demonstrate significant
performance improvement of our protocol, when compared to
conventional transmission protocol with ground relaying and
UAV-based transmission protocol without destination-assisted
jamming. We also identified the best location of U that
provides the optimal ASR, given a fixed eavesdropper loca-
tion. Finally, we evaluated the impacts of different system
parameters on the system performance. For future work, we
will consider the extension to flying UAV relaying with extra
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degrees of freedom in the system design.
APPENDIX A
DERIVATION OF CONNECTION PROBABILITY
The connection probability Pc given by (18) can be obtained
as follows (see (A.1)) where X
∆
= Sau, Y
∆
= Sub,
A
∆
=
(1 − β + ζ)N0δt
(1− β)PaLau B
∆
=
N0δt
εβPaLauLub
and Q(a, b) is the first-order Marqum Q-function, and Iν(·)
is the modified Bessel function of the first kind with νth
order. Furthermore, (a) follows from plugging the approximate
expressions for Q(·, ·) and I0(·) given respectively as [29]
I0(y) =
R∑
r=0
Γ(R+ r)R1−2r
Γ2(r + 1)Γ(R− r + 1)
(y
2
)2r
, (A.2)
and
Q(x, y) =
D∑
d=0
d∑
u=0
Γ(D + d)D1−2dx2dy2u
Γ(D − d+ 1)d!u!2d+u e
−x2+y2
2 , (A.3)
Finally, applying the equation [27, Eq. (3.471.9)] for calculat-
ing the integral expression of the last equation of (A.1), one
can reach, after tedious manipulations, at (20) and so the proof
is done.
APPENDIX B
DERIVATION OF SECRECY OUTAGE PROBABILITY
To obtain Pso we need to calculate L1 and L2. Henceforth,
in order to calculate L1, let define Sae ∆= V and Sbe ∆= W
while rewriting (23) as
L1 = Pr
{
V <
PbLbeδe
PaLae
W +
N0δe
PaLae
}
= EW
{
FV |W
(
PbLbeδe
PaLae
w +
N0δe
PaLae
)}
= 1−
∫ ∞
0
exp
(
−
[
PbLbeδe
PaLae
+ 1
]
w− N0δe
PaLae
)
dw, (B.1)
calculating the last integral results in (23).
Now, we focus on obtaining an analytical expression for L2
as follows. By defining the auxiliary variables a1
∆
= δe
PbLub
PaLau
,
a2
∆
= δe
N0
εβPaLauLue
, a3
∆
= δe
(1−β+ζ)N0
(1−β)PaLau , and letting X
∆
=
Sau, Y
∆
= Sub, and Z
∆
= Sue, one can rewrite L2 given in
(24) as
L2 = Pr{X ≤ a1Y + a2Z−1 + a3}
= EZ{EY |Z{FX|Y,Z(a1y + a2z−1 + a3)}
= 1−
∫ ∞
0
Ξ(z)fZ(z)dz, (B.2)
where Ξ(z)
∆
=
∫∞
0 Q
(√
a,
√
by + c(z)
)
fY (y)dy in which
a
∆
= 2Kau, b
∆
= 2(1+Kau)a1, c(z)
∆
= 2(1+Kau)(a2z
−1+a3).
Then, Ξ(z) is calculated in a closed-form expression using
(A.3) given in Appendix A as (see (B.3)). in which b˜
∆
=
b
2 + Kub + 1, c˜
∆
=
√
Kub(1 +Kub). Moreover, (b) comes
from using [27, Eq. (6.643.2)] to calculate the integral term,
wherein M(·) is the Whittaker M-function. Next, in order to
obtain a closed-form expression for the single-form integral
given by (B.2) we further calculate as (see (B.4)), where
c1
∆
= Kue(Kue + 1), b1
∆
= Kue + 1, b2
∆
= 2(Kue + 1)a3,
b3
∆
= 2(Kue + 1)a2, and Kν(·) denotes the modified Bessel
function with the second kind and ν-th order. Note that the
above equation achieved by applying [27, Eq. (3.478.4)].
Finally, through tedious mathematical manipulations we can
achieve the closed-form expression for the SOP given by (24),
and hence, the proof is done.
APPENDIX C
DERIVATION OF OPTIMAL λ⋆
Taking the auxiliary variables
c1
∆
=
εβ(1− β)PXY
εβ(1− β + ζ)Y N0 + (1− β)N0 , c2
∆
=
PV
N0
c3
∆
=
PW
N0
, c4
∆
=
εβ(1− β)PXZ
εβ(1− β + ζ)ZN0 + (1− β)N0
c5
∆
=
εβ(1 − β)PY Z
εβ(1− β + ζ)ZN0 + (1− β)N0
we rewrite the function Φ(λ), considering high Transmit SNR
approximation, as
Φ(λ) ≈ c1c3c5λ(λ − 1)
2
b2λ2 + b1λ+ b0
, (C.1)
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L2 = 1−
D∑
d=0
d∑
u=0
u∑
r=0
Q∑
q=0
u−r∑
s=0
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where b2 = (c4−c5)c3+c2c5, b1 = (2c5−c4)c3−c2c5−c2−c4,
b0 = −c3c5. Now, taking the first derivation of the function
Φ w.r.t λ, i.e., Φ1(λ)
∆
= dΦ(λ)dλ results a rational polynomial
function with always-positive denominator and the numerator
of forth-order, where it can readily be found that 0 and 1 are
the roots of both Φ(λ) and its first derivative Φ1(λ). Hence
the remained two roots are the solutions of the second order
polynomial given as
(ν − 1)λ2 + 2λ− 1 = 0 (C.2)
where ν = c2c5+c3c4c3c5 . As such, considering the feasible set of
0 < λ < 1, we have three cases as
1) ν < 1, no optimum solution
2) ν = 1, λ⋆ = 12
3) ν > 1, λ⋆ = 1
1+
√
ν
Furthermore, note that it is easy to prove Φ1(λ) holds positive
values in (0, λ⋆] and are negative in (λ⋆, 1) and the extremum
determines the maximum of the Φ(λ) [30], and hence the proof
is complete.
APPENDIX D
DERIVATION OF LOWER-BOUNDED ASR
In order to obtain a closed-form lower-bound expression
for E{CS}, one can write, following the Jensen’s inequality,
as [31] (see (D.1)). In (D.1), the term E{ln(γA 7→B)} is further
calculated as
E{ln(γA 7→B)} ≥ ln
(
(1− β)PaLau
(1− β + ζ)N0
)
+ E{ln(SauSub)}
− E
{
ln
(
Sub +
1− β
εβ(1− β + ζ)Lub
)}
∆
= T1, (D.2)
where T1 can be analytically obtained using Lemma 1 as given
in (38). Letting T2
∆
= E{γ(1)E } + E{γ(2)E }, the remained parts
E{γ(1)E } and E{γ(2)E } in (D.1) are derived as
E{γ(1)E } =
Pa
Pb
Lae
Lbe
exp
(
N0
PbLbe
)
E1
(
N0
PbLbe
)
, (D.3)
where E1(·) =
∫∞
1
e−txt−adx is the exponential integral, (b)
follows from the approximate given in [32] along considering
the tight lower bound for E
{
1
X
}
given in [33]. However that
10
E{CS} ≥ 1
2 ln 2
[
E{ln(1 + γA 7→B)} − E{ln(1 + γE)}
]+
≥ 1
2 ln 2
[
ln
(
1 + exp(E{ln(γA 7→B)})
)
− ln
(
1 + E{γ(1)E }+ E{γ(2)E }
)]+
, (D.1)
E{γ(2)E }
(b)≈ εβ(1 − β)Pa(λau + 2)(λue + 2)
εβ(1 − β)Pb(λbu + 2)(λue + 2) + εβ(1− β + ζ)(λue + 2)N0 + (1− β)N0 , (D.4)
E
{
1
X
}
can be readily obtained inasmuch as it equals to the
first derivative of g1(x), already given in (33), w.r.t x, we use
this tight approximation for simplicity.
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